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Kazakhstan-Japan Cooperation:
The Role of Kazakh Diplomatic Institutions in the Formation of Bilateral Political Discourse
DISSYUKOV Almas
Abstract
　　At the present moment, publications on various aspects related to the formation and 
development of the Japanese foreign policy prevail in academic literature. Indeed, many scholars pay 
increased attention to the activities of the Japanese state agencies, as well as political agents, as key 
elements of modern Japanese diplomacy. At the same time, there is a significant gap associated with 
the activities of foreign diplomatic missions and diplomats in Japan. Examining the activities of 
foreign diplomatic entities in Tokyo allows readers to get a fresh look at how Japanese partners are 
building their relationship with Japan and what tools they used in order to achieve their primary 
goals. In this regard, the author uses constructivism, as well as desk research and discourse analysis 
to evaluate the activities of diplomatic missions in the formation of Japan’s Central Asian vector, 
using the example of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry and its Embassy in Tokyo. In this paper, the 
author uses all available sources, including relevant legal acts, as well as numerous articles, speeches, 
and interviews by retired and acting Kazakh diplomats that were usually ignored by the academic society.
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Ｉ．Introduction
　　Stories about external relations of ancient Kazakh rulers (1465-1847) are well preserved in Russian, 
Chinese, and Persian written sources. For many scholars, such information is extremely valuable and 
helps to understand the historical roots of modern relations between Kazakhstan and three power centers, 
namely, Russia, China, and the Middle East. At the same time, there were countries with which the 
Kazakhs could not establish a direct contact. The modern history of Kazakh diplomacy is associated with 
two key milestones. First, during the existence of the Soviet Union (USSR), the Kazakh Soviet Socialist 
Republic (SSR) had its Foreign Ministry (MFA) (since 13 Apr. 1944), which, unfortunately, could not fully 
participate in the decision-making process. As a result, for many years, the MFA had exclusively performed 
routine administrative and protocol functions1. Secondly, in 1991, after the USSR collapsed, Kazakhstan, 
1　 75 let NKID KazSSR: start, opredelivshiy budushcheye, MFA of Kazakhstan, http://www.mfa.kz/ru/bern/content-
view/75-let-nkid-kazssr-start-opredelivsij-budusee. (Accessed: 05/12/2019).
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as the “sovereign” state, gained a historic chance to set diverse foreign policy strategies. It is important 
to note that Kazakh political leaders were able to preserve the legacy of Kazakh Soviet diplomats, e.g. 
1927-1932 USSR envoy to Saudi Arabia Mr. Nazir Turakulov, and incorporate some elements of their 
professional heritage into the diplomacy of modern Kazakhstan (Wahab 2016). This is a unique case when 
a country adopts professional experience of Soviet diplomats, but not their ideological beliefs. In fact, 
Kazakhstan is pulling them out of general context of the Soviet past, giving them a more ethnic character.
　　At the end of the 20th century, Kazakhstan and Japan, despite the geographical distance, got a 
chance to establish own model of bilateral relations (Rakhimov 2014:78). On its part, Japan could not 
neglect the fact that burial places of the Japanese prisoners of war (POW) were located in Central Asia 
(CA) because of the results of World War II. Today, these places became a part of the Japanese political 
discourse and its relations with the CA countries. For many Japanese politicians, these tombs have 
become a sort of pilgrimage site (Dadabaev 2016:11). It is clear only mutual interest encouraged the two 
countries to achieve the current level of “expanded strategic partnership”2 (Nurgaliyeva 2015:365). At the 
same time, there were both active and passive phases in Kazakh-Japan relations. For instance, protracted 
political crisis in Japan in 2006-2012, which led to the replacement of six Prime Ministers (PMs) and two 
ruling administrations, i.e. three PMs from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and three PMs from the 
Democratic Party (DPJ), had a significant influence on Japanese domestic and foreign strategies (Howe 
and Campbell 2013:99). After the first official visit of the PM of Japan to Kazakhstan, in Aug. 2006, 
there were only three visits by the Japanese Cabinet members to Kazakhstan in six years, including two 
visits by Ministers of Economy, Trade and Industry (2007, 2010), and one visit by the Foreign Minister 
(2010). Relations between the two countries continued to develop mainly due to 11 visits by high-ranking 
Kazakh officials to Japan3. This means the efforts of foreign policy institutions played a substantial role in 
maintaining and adapting bilateral relations to various unforeseen fluctuations. This also gives a reason to 
articulate about the presence of certain “social structures” that act as a framework for bilateral relations.
　　According to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, “diplomatic missions” 
perform five key functions, namely: representation, protection of state interests, negotiation, gathering 
information and promoting of friendly relations4. The fulfillment of these functions is impossible without 
the participation of specific agents, i.e. diplomats and embassies, as “basic structures”. To date, Japanese 
retired diplomats, i.e. Ambassador Kyoko Nakayama (Nakayama 2005), Amb. Akira Matsui (Matsui 
2007), Amb. Toshio Tsunozaki (Tsunozaki 2007), Amb. Akio Kawato (Kawato 2008), and Professor 
Tomohiko Uyama (Uyama 2004, 2008, 2010, 2015), have published several comprehensive books about 
their experience of living and working in the CA countries. Indeed, these authors help to understand how 
2　 The title of the joint statement by PM Abe of Japan and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, which was adopted on 7 
Nov. 2016 in Japan.
3　 All information on bilateral visits could be seen on the Japanese MOFA website in “Japan-Kazakhstan Relations” 
section, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/kazakhstan/data.html. (Accessed: 03/12/2019).
4　The UN website, https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf. (Accessed: 05/12/2019).
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the image of Kazakhstan and its perception has been changing among Japanese officials, business and 
academic communities over two decades. Unfortunately, Kazakh diplomats have not yet published a single 
book, which poses certain difficulties for scholars when studying “the Japanese angle” of Kazakhstan’s 
foreign policy.
　　Constructivism assists in systematizing the existing discourses from all sources available for scholars, 
e.g. materials issued by Kazakh diplomats or diplomatic institutions in Japan. It also helps to understand 
what role they play in the formation of “Self” and “Others”. This framework is the most suitable because 
the majority of messages, addressed to the two states, go through various diplomatic channels, where 
the states themselves act as main idea generators. The author argues that Kazakh diplomats in Tokyo, 
as the country’s representatives, have been acting as “Half-Self” and “Half-Others” (the author would 
like to propose these two definitions for a better description of the situation)5, since they are forced to 
simultaneously demonstrate two separate identities. On one hand, they act as conductors of Kazakh national 
interests in Japan. On the other hand, they function as conductors of Japanese interests in Kazakhstan, 
because such behavior helps them to solve two different goals. First, they could interpret Japanese actions 
as the result of their direct/indirect manipulations, as well as to get political dividends for their support to 
the Japanese efforts in Kazakhstan, i.e. quid pro quo. 
　　The main argument of the author is that the low status of Kazakhstan in the political discourse of 
Japan6 forces one state (Kazakhstan) to influence political circles of another state (Japan) in order to 
achieve a desired level of cooperation through manipulations of local politicians and their foreign policy 
orienteer. Kazakhstan is trying to cope with this challenge by constructing two different relations: (1) 
“Self” vs. “Others”, i.e. appealing to various opposite characteristics such as differences in the country size, 
the availability of natural resources, the possession of sophisticated technologies, expertise, and human 
resources under the frequently used by the Kazakh side principle of “complementarity” (Mager 2016); (2) 
“Self” vs. “Self”, i.e. appealing to such similar characteristics as having similar distinct Asian appearance7, 
the similarity of historical destinies (e.g. parallels between Semipalatinsk and Hiroshima/Nagasaki) (Abe 
2015), historical connection (e.g. POWs, including through the study of their heritage in Kazakhstan and 
more modern forms, i.e. theatre plays (Beisembina 2017)).
　　In this paper, the author poses the following questions: 1) What role do diplomatic agents play in 
the development of Kazakhstan-Japan relations? 2) What are the main features of their approaches and 
strategies? 3) What channels are used by the Kazakh side to exchange norms and lapping identities? In 
5　 In the author’s understanding, diplomatic institutions perform an important function, which, like a lens, allows them to 
project, reflect (“mirror”) and adjust the messages of both national and foreign leaders to their specifics respectively 
(Wendt 1992:406). In this process, they are forced not to balance, but to be able to reproduce two identities in the so-
called “intermediate state”, which fits the description of “Half-Self” and “Half-Other”.
6　  Prof. Shigeki Hakamada, personal communication on 27 Feb. 2018.
7　 In 2015, during the visit of PM Shinzo Abe to CA, Kazakh politicians, including the President himself, often joked about 
the similarity of Kazakhs and Japanese during official meetings.
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order to answer these questions, the author gradually reveals key aspects of the formation of the Kazakh 
diplomacy and its presence in Japan, including through the prism of Kazakh ambassadors and ordinary 
diplomats in Tokyo, as well as existing bilateral dialogue mechanisms (Wendt 1992:417).
Ⅱ．Basic Information
　　In Japanese sources, the readers can note various references to the historical trips of notable Japanese 
researchers to certain areas of Central Asia. In fact, these authors form the basis for Japanese modern 
interest to the region, which once played an important role in the functioning of the Great Silk Road8. 
A short time ago, Kazakh officials started to cite numerous archival reports about the interest of Kazakh 
scholars and politicians of the late 19th and early 20th centuries in Japan, including famous traveler and 
scholar Mr. Shokan Valikhanov (Akyn and Aitmagambetova 2012:27-29), leaders of Alash movement, 
e.g. Mr. Alikhan Bukeikhan, as well as poet Mr. Mukhtar Auezov (Auezov 2017). In many ways, such 
interest was related to the desire of people to follow a new model of state development, including the 
transformation of Kazakh territories into a “second Japan” to achieve the level of advanced nations (Khan 
Akkuly 2016).
　　During Soviet times, Kazakhstan was very far from obtaining direct contacts with Japan. At that time, 
many citizens fall victim to Stalin’s repressions; that included the charges of spying for Japan9. Later, 
together with the Red Army, they took part in the 1945 Soviet-Japanese war, which should have led to 
the establishing of a negative image of Japan. However, this did not happen (Suzuki 2013). In a broader 
sense, these actions or “experiences” became important in terms of understanding modern CA and its 
contemporary international relations (Kavalski 2010:4). The recognition of Kazakhstan’s independence 
and establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations in 1991-1992 became a starting point of modern 
Kazakh-Japan cooperation. Kazakh politicians and diplomats often recite the words of the pre-Soviet 
Kazakh intelligentsia, indicating them as the basis of traditional interest to Japan. On one hand, this can be 
considered as an excuse for a pleasant conversation, on the other, as a desire of the Kazakh authorities to 
build a historical closeness of the two nations, i.e. to adjust two identities. In this manner, it can be said that 
foundations of the structures of “human association” between Kazakhstan and Japan are partly determined 
by shared ideas, i.e. aspirations, and that the foundations of the identities and interests are constructed by 
these shared ideas (Wendt 1999:1).
8　 “Tsentralnoaziatskaya diplomatiya Yaponii”, Qazaqstan tarihy, https://e-history.kz/ru/publications/view/4519. 
(Accessed: 05/12/2019).
9　 For example, in 1929, famous Kazakh poet Magzhan Zhumabaev was arrested on false charges of nationalism, 
espionage in favor of Japan and the creation of an underground group. “Magzhan Zhumabaev”, Tengrinews, https://
tengrinews.kz/tag/%D0%96%D1%83%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B5%D0%B2-%D0%9C%D0%B
0%D0%B3%D0%B6%D0%B0%D0%BD/. (Accessed: 05/12/2019).
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　　In the 1990s, the diplomatic initiative belonged to the Japanese side. Diplomatic relations between the 
two countries were established on 26 Jan. 1992. A year later, on 20 Jan. 1993, the Japanese Embassy began 
its work in Kazakhstan. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry (MOFA 2019), there are diplomatic 
missions of 155 countries and 39 international organizations (IOs) in Japan; honorary consulates of 96 
countries operate in various Japanese regions. The Kazakh Embassy in Japan was opened four years 
later, in Feb. 1997. The corresponding Presidential Decree no. 3255 on the opening of Kazakhstan’s 
embassies in Japan and several other countries, including Austria and Malaysia, was signed on 5 Dec. 1996 
(Tengrinews 1996). It can be assumed that at the initial stage, Kazakhstan was satisfied with interaction 
through the Japanese offices in Kazakhstan and bilateral exchanges. This was a necessary measure due to 
the lack of sufficient financial and human resources in Kazakhstan in the early 1990s.
１．Diplomacy of Kazakhstan
　　According to a long-standing Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who became 
the second President of Kazakhstan, in 2019, Soviet diplomacy did not fit the policy of independent 
Kazakhstan due to differences in ideologies, principles and goals (Tokayev 2001). Therefore, the author 
decided to choose 1991-2019 timeframe and apply constructivism, which allows to understand the nature 
and functions of diplomatic missions in the formation of new unknown identities, norms, and ideas that 
Kazakhstan applies vis-à-vis Japan and, hereby, to answer above-mentioned research questions. Speaking 
about the importance of Japan, it is worth noting that Japan for many years was one of the major donors 
for Kazakhstan. In Oct. 1992, Japan hosted the Tokyo Conference on Assistance to the Newly Independent 
States (MOFA 1992). In addition, Japan contributed to Kazakhstan’s early membership in both the 
ADB and the EBRD, which, in turn, contributed to the implementation of vital infrastructure and social 
projects in the country. In Sept. 1999, Japan hosted the International Conference on Semipalatinsk. The 
forum allowed Kazakhstan to get additional assistance in the rehabilitation of affected people and areas 
contaminated by radiation. However, such assistance was provided based on the “help for self-help” 
principle, laid down in 1992 (MOFA 2000). In fact, this norm is one of the key aspects of the Japanese 
“Self-Others” identity towards all CA countries. On its part, Kazakh officials regularly use these historical 
episodes to demonstrate Kazakhstan’s “grateful nature” in relation to Japan. As follows, Kazakhstan 
retains the open door for new cooperation programs. Such an attitude by Kazakh authorities also helps 
the Japanese Government to justify economic assistance to Kazakhstan. Thereof, appropriate references 
of Japan are reflected in many key documents for Kazakhstan such as the Foreign Policy Concept (2014-
2020) and the National Investment Strategy (2018-2022) (MFA 2014). In 2019, Japan also joined the top 
40 countries for Kazakhstan’s economic diplomacy in terms of bilateral trade, investment and transfer of 
technological expertise (Demidov 2019). Even earlier, in 2016, visa requirements for visiting Kazakhstan 
were unilaterally lifted for all Japanese citizens (InformBureau 2016).
　　In addition, Japan cannot ignore the fact that Kazakh side entrusted the development of the master 
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plan for the new capital to a famous Japanese architect Mr. Kisho Kurokawa10. Another Japanese 
architect Mr. Kiyonori Kikutake also designed several buildings in the city (Ogawa 2009:86). In 2010, 
former World Bank’s Regional Vice President Mr. Shigeo Katsu headed Kazakhstan’s flagship of higher 
education--Nazarbayev University (Abe 2015). Today, many projects related to the capital of Kazakhstan 
are associated with the aspirations of the country’s First President to project Kazakhstan as “a strong and 
rapidly developing nation”11. Not so accidentally, the Japanese have become a part of this process and 
discourse. And, the Japanese themselves began to involuntarily compare this process with the “o-yatoi 
gaikokujin” (“hired foreigners”) effect of Meiji Restoration in Japan (Ogawa 2009:83).
　　Nine years ago, Kazakhstan discussed the possibility of launching an exclusive program of 
cooperation with Asian countries-- “Asian Vector”. This program was supposed to replicate the success 
of another no less ambitious State program of Kazakhstan titled “Path to Europe for 2009-2011” (Zakon.
kz 2011). The objective of the new program, which was never launched, was to develop trade, economic 
and investment cooperation with the leading countries of the region; and secure Kazakh membership in 
political, security, and economic forums of Asia12. Unlike European countries, the Asian Vector’s fail13 
suggests that Kazakhstan has been considering Asian region as a complex task, which cannot rely on the 
use of standard approaches and fit for all principles of cooperation. Accordingly, Asia requires an exclusive 
algorithm for each country, especially for such specific nations as China, Korea, and Japan. For example, 
according to previous Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Mr. Ichiro Kawabata, China occupies the main 
place in Kazakh diplomacy, while Japan holds an only ninth place (Kawabata 2018). 
　　In this regard, the author provides a more detailed analysis of each “agency, process and structure” 
(Wendt 1992:422), as indicated below.
２．Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan
　　The Law on Diplomatic Service (2002) regulates MFA activities. The Minister, to whom all 
departments and other relevant organizations are subordinate, heads the MFA. However, the Minister 
directly manages only a few divisions, primarily related to strategic planning, state secrets and auditing14 
; five deputy ministers and one executive secretary supervise separate departments. Cooperation with 
Japan is simultaneously “covered” by several departments--the Investment Committee, the Committee for 
International Information (media), the Department of Asia and the Pacific (CA+Japan Dialogue (CAJ), 
10　 “Kisho Kurokawa--simbioticheskaya arkhitektura i futuristicheskiy dizayn dlya Astany”, Kazinform, 30 Jun. 2018, 
https://www.inform.kz/ru/kise-kurokava-simbioticheskaya-arhitektura-i-futuristicheskiy-dizayn-dlya-astany_
a3304816. (Accessed: 05/12/2019).
11　Ibid.
12　The author interviewed an unnamed employee of the MFA Kazakhstan on 21 Jun. 2019.
13　 Analysis of open documents at the MFA’s website shows that the document was not approved.
14　 The schematic structure of the MFA, including the number of employees, is publicly available on the MFA’s website, 
http://mfa.gov.kz/ru/content-view/organizatsionnaya-struktura-mid. (Accessed: 06/01/2020).
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ASEM, bilateral issues, etc.), Department of Multilateral Cooperation (UN and other IOs), Department 
of International Security, Department of Consular Service and others. The Department of Asia and the 
Pacific is supervised by the First Deputy Minister, which proves the special importance of Asia in the 
MFA’s work15. At the same time, issues of international cooperation are also monitored at the level of the 
Executive Offices of the President (Akorda), PM, Parliament and Security Council16. Accordingly, the 
Embassy is experiencing pressure from two sides--from the MFA and other state bodies of Kazakhstan, as 
well as from Japanese public and private agencies. As was acknowledged by Kazakh diplomat, one of the 
most pressing issue remains to be the coordination of international activities of all Kazakh public agencies, 
which sometimes try to pursue own tactics and strategies17. In fact, the Embassy acts as an “entry point” 
for Japanese initiatives (in addition to the Japanese Embassy in Kazakhstan), as well as an “exit point” 
of Kazakhstani ideas. This suggests that embassies as agents of their respective countries are responsible 
for: (a) transmission of ideas, norms and identities about their leaders and nations; (b) analysis of the 
Japanese international behavior and perception of its international role. In this regard, the author develops 
an analysis of the Kazakh Embassy’s role with the heads of diplomatic missions and ordinary diplomats, 
whose real cases could help to understand the notion of “human consciousness” in action (Hyaes 2017:91), 
as well as reveal the “systematic communication ontology” (Wendt 1992:425) of Kazakh-Japan relations.
Ⅲ．Kazakh Ambassadors: From Career Politicians to Career Diplomats
　　In contrast to Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and other post-Soviet countries, during the USSR era, 
there were no noticeable Kazakh diplomats, who occupied senior posts in the Soviet embassy in Japan. 
However, this does not mean that Kazakhstan did not have any specialists with knowledge of the Japanese 
language. Nevertheless, the recent growth of language specialists is related to the increased availability of 
Japanese language courses in Kazakhstan (Sugiura 2007:121). 
　　In Feb. 2020, the two countries celebrated the 28th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations. 
Over this time, only three Kazakh ambassadors were dispatched to Japan. They are Mr. Tleukhan 
Kabdrakhmanov (1996-2003), Mr. Bolat Nurgaliyev (2003-2006) and Mr. Akylbek Kamaldinov (2007-
2016). At the same time, the record belongs to Amb. Kamaldinov, who spent almost ten years in Japan18. 
Current Ambassador, Yerlan Baudarbek-Kozhatayev, was appointed in 2016. Due to recent amendments 
15　 For example, Deputy Minister Margulan Baimukhan oversees the Department of Europe. In fall 2019, First Deputy 
Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi was appointed as new Foreign Minister.
16　 The Department of Foreign Policy and International Relations of the Presidential Office monitors the implementation 
of the state’s foreign policy by all agencies. Please see PO’s website, http://www.akorda.kz/ru/executive_office/
executive_office_stucture/structural_subdivisions/otdel-vneshnei-politiki-i-mezhdunarodnyh-svyazei. (Accessed: 
06/12/2019).
17　The author interviewed an unnamed employee of the MFA Kazakhstan on 21 Jun. 2019.
18　 Copies of all decrees available on the President’s website. The biographies of the ambassadors were taken from the 
websites of the embassies of Kazakhstan in Japan and Canada.
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introduced to the above-mentioned Law, the term of assignment of new Kazakh ambassadors to Japan 
should not exceed five years (Zakon.kz 2017).
　　The first Kazakh Ambassador to Japan is an economist by training. In 1991-1993, he served as a 
Chairman of the State Economic Committee (Cabinet member). According to Kazakh experts, the task of 
the first Kazakh ambassadors was “to create the infrastructure of Kazakh diplomacy abroad” (Ashimbayev 
2014). However, the choice in favor of an expert with an economic background was determined by the 
desire of Kazakh leadership to effectively use the Japanese experience of economic reforms, as well 
as to develop close trade relations with Japan19. In addition, the first specialists who knew Japanese 
language worked together with Amb. Kabdrakhmanov, i.e. succeeding Kazakh envoys to Japan (except 
for Amb. Nurgaliyev). Another “student” of Mr. Kabdrakhmanov--Mr. Sabr Yessimbekov--will later head 
Kazakhstan-Japan Business Cooperation Committee. In fact, such steps remind the readers of Kazakh 
intelligentsia voices about creation of “Second Japan”. At that time, Japan’s case began to appear among 
possible models for future Kazakhstan’s reforms. In addition, local media began to recall the interest of 
Kazakh scholars in pre-war Japan, despite its WWII legacy.
　　Second Ambassador, Mr. Bolat Nurgaliyev20, had been engaged in security issues at the MFA. The 
appointment of the former Ambassador of Kazakhstan to the US (1996-2000) was aimed at a possible 
strengthening of the political dialogue between the two countries, including in the field of security. It is 
possible that amid the post-9/11 events, Kazakhstan was interested in a possible convergence with the U.S. 
and Japan on regional security issues, including Central Asia. It is noteworthy that after his assignment in 
Tokyo, Amb. Nurgaliyev was appointed as a Secretary-General of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(2007-2009) and later became a Special Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for Protracted 
Conflicts (2010). Completion of his diplomatic mission in Japan coincided with another significant 
achievement for CA countries--the first visit of Japanese PM to Central Asia in Aug. 2006 (Bilyal 2019).
　　Mr. Kamaldinov became the first Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Japan who knew Japanese. According 
to his biography, he studied Japanese at the Moscow’s Institute of Asian and African Countries  in 1990-
1992, as well as at the Japan Foundation’s Language Institute in Saitama in 1995. In fact, it was the first 
successful case of Kazakhstan’s participation in the Japanese courses for Foreign-Service Officers & Public 
Officials. Mr. Kamaldinov had also taught Japanese at the Kazakh National University (1992-1993). Later, 
the MFA recruited him as part of efforts to enforce its professional personnel. Before his high assignment, 
in 2003-2007, Mr. Kamaldinov served as the head of the external relations department at the PM’s Office. 
The appointment of new Kazakh Ambassador in 2007 also coincided with the visit of a large delegation of 
Japanese business community led by then-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Akira Amari, whose 
trip helped the new envoy to create a favorable launch pad in Japan. Accordingly, it can be assumed that 
19　 According to the MFA representative, the prerogative to appoint Kazakh ambassadors belongs only to the Head of 
State (Art. 44 of the Constitution).
20　 Ambassador’s biography is available on Zakon.kz website, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_
id=31161664#pos=1;90. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
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the appointment of a Japanese-speaking Kamaldinov was a demonstration of Kazakhstan’s respect and 
pragmatic intentions to develop close cooperation with Japan. His long stay in Japan can be considered 
as an indicator of the success of the strategy chosen by Akorda. It should be noted that many Japanese 
Ambassadors in Kazakhstan so far have only been fluent in Russian or English. 
　　In 2016, another Japanese expert, Mr. Baudarbek-Kozhatayev, who also studied Japanese at the 
Moscow’s Institute of Asian and African Countries, Japan Foundation (Saitama) and JICA Okinawa Centre, 
replaced Amb. Kamaldinov. He also translated working meetings of the former Kazakh leader in Japan in 
1994, 1999 and 2016 (Baudarbek-Kozhatayev 2016). In 2017, Amb. Baudarbek-Kozhatayev became a 
visiting professor at Tokai University, despite the lack of previous research experience (Tokai Univ. 2017). 
This was the first case when a Kazakh diplomat began to engage in academic activities in Japan in prallel 
with his diplomatic work. This may be connected to the plans to enhance Kazakhstan-related discourse 
reaching the academic field, which until now has been limited by the occasional lectures of Kazakh 
ambassadors.
　　In most cases, as recent appointments suggest, a certain circle of the MFA specialists knowing 
Japanese was formed in Kazakhstan with the help of Japanese public and private sectors (“Japanese 
school”). For example, a similar situation today is observed in Kazakh embassies in France, Germany, 
Poland, China, Turkey and the Arab countries. On one hand, this suggests that Japan attaches great 
importance to the training of Kazakh civil servants in Japan. On the other hand, this indicates that 
Kazakhstan supports this process to maintain the so-called “affinity bonds” with Japan, which Japanese 
politicians so often refer to. If earlier this definition implied only the factor of Japanese POWs, today 
this phrase implies the absence of political contradictions, as well as strong support for the Japanese 
international initiatives among CA countries. 
　　Today, development of professional human resources between Kazakhstan and Japan is carried out 
through the International Scholarship of the President of Kazakhstan (Bolashak) and scholarships of the 
Government of Japan (MEXT, JICA, ADB-JSP, JJWBGSP21) (Abe 2015). According to Mr. Isao Iijima, 
Special Advisor to the Cabinet, currently, there is a boom of foreign ambassadors in Japan with high-
level proficiency in Japanese22. The Japanese government also supports this trend. It could be proved by 
regular meetings of the PM of Japan with Japanese speaking ambassadors in his official residence (Kantei). 
The recent (fifth) group meeting with the participation of 19 ambassadors (e.g. Afghanistan, Armenia, 
China, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) was held on 8 Jan. 2020 (PM Office 2020). In 2010, 
similar idea was implemented by the DPJ, when they founded the “Café Democrats” to develop a direct 
dialogue between party members and the diplomatic corps (DPJ 2010). However, the first association of 
Japanese speaking ambassadors--“Heisei-Kai”--was created even earlier, in the 1990s (Japan Foundation 
21　 In different years, the author applied for all the scholarships indicated. In 2017, he received a MEXT scholarship. Since 
2018, he serves as an External Relations Officer at the MEXT Scholars Association.
22　 Link to Isao Iijima’s article in Shukan Bunshun, https://ameblo.jp/makuharihongo-wako/entry-12136118175.html. 
(Accessed: 19/06/2019).
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2004). Heisei-Kai members regularly promoted exclusive group meetings between foreign ambassadors 
and prominent Japanese politicians and diplomats. Kazakh Embassy has been actively involved in all 
these initiatives. As a result, the “language” factor serves as a sort of “invitation” to participate in political 
discourse at the highest political level. Such “signals” from both sides help Kazakh diplomats with 
Japanese skills to actively participate in the local debate on the Japanese foreign policy.
　　It is mean that through a well-adjusted personnel policy, over the past 12 years Akorda has been trying 
to participate in this process. At the same time, Kazakh ambassadors are trying to convey their vision not 
only in Japan but also in Kazakhstan through local media. Two objectives can be seen in this trend: first, to 
strengthen the support for their endeavors among the elites and second, to strengthen the national discourse 
on the importance of Japan. In total, these efforts help them to enhance Kazakh support to the Japanese 
actions. 
　　These findings also forced the author to look at the cases of ordinary diplomats, who live and work 
under conditions of “international life” (Hyaes 2017:91).
１．Ordinary Diplomats: “Small” Bridges of Friendship
　　In Japanese media, the readers can discover only minor notes about the work of Kazakh Embassy’s 
staff (except for the Ambassador). Similar situation is observed regarding the Japanese Embassy in 
Kazakhstan. Exceptions are Ms. Mariko Tsunokake (MOFA staff) and Mrs. Kanae Yamamoto (MP, 
Komeito), who were able to win the sympathy of Kazakh people thanks to their knowledge of Kazakh 
language (Nur.kz 2017). As a result, Kazakh media frequently manipulated the image of “kindred” 
Japanese diplomats in various domestic discourses related to the national language policy. At the same 
time, Kazakh diplomats with Japanese skills are in a less advantageous position, since the number of 
various specialists in Japan with a high level of Japanese has significantly increased in recent years. For 
them, language serves exclusively as a professional tool. Nevertheless, Kazakh diplomats have been trying 
to take an active part in various speech contests, including famous among foreign diplomats--“Zainichi 
kakkoku taishikan-in nihongo supīchi kontesuto”. To date, only Mrs. Akerke Sultanova, who worked as an 
assistant to the Kazakh ambassador in Tokyo, and published a very successful book on the history of the 
Semipalatinsk Test Site, achieved the most outstanding success (Sultanova 2018).
　　According to the Embassy’s website (2019), the mission is currently employing seven diplomats of 
various ranks, from attaché to minister-counselor. Three of them are graduates of the Univ. of Tsukuba 
(Japan)23. There are no large structural units in the Embassy responsible for the implementation of separate 
dimensions. One or two persons lead each direction. Political and economic issues are the responsibility of 
senior diplomats and, “international cooperation” is in conjunction with “protocol” and “tourism”. This fact 
may indicate that the key issues of international cooperation are discussed directly through the permanent 
missions of the two countries in New York, Geneva or Vienna. In addition, CAJ Dialogue, which is the 
23　Excerpt from the speech of Amb. Baudarbek-Kozhatayev at the Univ. of Tsukuba on 21 May 2019.
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only multilateral dialogue platform between Japan and CA, does not have a secretariat. Nevertheless, the 
MOFA conducts regular diplomatic retreats with CA envoys, presumably to probe new ideas or convey 
political messages, including in the framework of CAJ format (Dissyukov 2019:13). This shows that 
such favorable conditions help Kazakh diplomats in Tokyo to focus exclusively on the bilateral agenda. 
Moreover, according to the Kazakh diplomat, Japanese entities create numerous opportunities of informal 
communication between foreign diplomats and local opinion leaders, as well as their spouses, offering 
them honorary membership in various elite associations (e.g. International Friendship Exchange Council, 
Roppongi Hills Club, Koganei Golf Club). Foreign diplomats also create own exchange associations  (e.g. 
Nadeshiko-kai, Tokyo Diplomatic Group). Nevertheless, such associations do not exist among CA or CIS 
diplomats.
　　During the absence of Kazakh ambassadors (before the arrival of the first Ambassador and between 
shifts of subsequent ambassadors), functions of temporary heads were performed by Mr. Yessimbekov 
(1995-1996), Mr. Baudarbek-Kozhatayev (2003), Ms. Dinara Zheldybaeva (2006-2007) and Mr. Almas 
Dissyukov (2016). 
２．Commercial Attaches
　　In 2016-2018, an Investment Counsellor for the first and the last time was dispatched to the Embassy. 
The institute of “Investment Counselors”, as agents of the former Ministry of Investment and Development, 
was introduced in order “to attract investment from ten priority countries, e.g. China, France, Germany, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, the U.K., and the U.S.” (MFA 2018). In Japan, Mr. Arystan Kabikenov occupied 
this post. He was dispatched to Japan from the high post of the Deputy Head of the PM’s Office (2015-
2016). After his temporary assignment to Japan, he was appointed as the Vice Minister of Industry and 
Infrastructure Development and later as the Deputy to the Governor of Pavlodar Oblast. The appointment 
of an investment officer was initiated to show that Kazakhstan is ready and able to promote the presence of 
Japanese TNCs and SMEs in Kazakhstan. This “experiment” most likely ceased to exist after the transfer 
of investment-related offices and companies to the MFA in Jan. 2019. Nevertheless, this “experience” can 
be attributed to the signal that Kazakhstan was close to converting the nature of its diplomatic institutions 
in Japan to focus more on economic and trade-related tasks. For example, there are 12 diplomats at 
the Japanese Embassy in Nur-Sultan, including the Ambassador, the military attaché and one officer 
responsible for the economic bloc (State Protocol Service 2019:30). The economic bloc is solely focused 
on promoting the interests of Japanese business24, which indicates the differences in the identities of the 
two countries.
24　The MOFA has established the “Japanese Business Support Promotion Headquarter” to advance Japan’s international 
competitiveness. The liaison officer at the Embassy level is First Secretary Mr. Yukio Ishibiki, who is also a specialist in 
energy and mineral resources. Please see the Embassy’s and MOFA’s websites, https://www.kz.emb-japan.go.jp/jp/about-us/
tantoukan/index.htm and https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000243362.pdf. (Accessed: 05/12/2019).
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３． Military Attaches
　　According to Japanese Defense Ministry (2019), military attaches have been working in 82 embassies 
and five diplomatic missions of Japan. There is no military attaché at the Kazakh Embassy in Japan. In 
Central Asia, apart from Kazakhstan and Afghanistan, there are no Japanese military attaches. The specific 
foundations of Kazakh-Japanese defense cooperation were laid in the 2017 Memorandum on Defense 
Cooperation and Exchanges. Among the main tasks, there are security issues and regional situations, 
UN peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism, maritime security, military science and education25. The 
Japanese military attaché in Kazakhstan is responsible for Japan’s cooperation with Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan as well. Given the area of responsibility of the Japanese military attaché, it can be assumed 
that Japanese authorities are interested in the military-political situation in CA and the Caucasus. These 
facts indicate that Japan’s interests towards CA are not limited solely to economic issues. The following 
question involuntarily arises--why did Japan choose Kazakhstan as the main basis of its security interests, 
and not Uzbekistan? In Apr. 2019, former PM of Kazakhstan, Mr. Karim Massimov, who is currently a 
Chairman of the National Security Committee (Kazakh heir of the Soviet KGB), visited Japan. However, 
the information about the visit and its content was not officially released by both states (Nikkei 2019). 
After the meeting with Mr. Massimov, Japanese PM also held talks with National Security Advisor, 
Director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, and Deputy Head of Public Security Intelligence 
Agency. This fact may be related to the intention of both states not to politicize certain aspects of bilateral 
cooperation, which may affect their relations with third-party countries, i.e. Russia or China. CA countries 
and Japan adopt a similar position in the CAJ framework, bypassing the discussion of the policies of third-
party countries (Dissyukov 2019:15). Accordingly, Kazakhstan and Japan do not intend to mix bilateral 
relations with “rivalry” or “balancing” norms.
Ⅳ．Official Attributes: To Purchase or Lease 
　　Embassies represent the most essential attribute of the country’s physical presence abroad. The history 
of the Kazakh Embassy’s buildings has at least three cases. Initially, the Embassy was located at the office 
building in Tokyo’s Shinagawa Ward. Later, the Embassy moved to a separate building in Meguro Ward. 
The Embassies of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic were also located nearby. In 2011, the Embassy of 
Kazakhstan moved to Minato Ward, next to the territory of the Russian Embassy, even though anti-Russian 
demonstrations often take place in that area26. It coincided in time so that after the Kazakhs the embassies 
of Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic also changed their locations. This example demonstrates the CA 
countries are trying to adhere to similar conditions in Japan. It also indicates CA diplomats are closely 
25　 The text of the document is available on the website of the Ministry of Defense of Japan, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/
approach/exchange/area/docs/2017/07/24_memo_kz_e.pdf. (Accessed: 12/12/2019).
26　 The author repeatedly witnessed such demonstrations during numerous visits to the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Tokyo 
during his studies in Japan.
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following the work of their colleagues in Tokyo. In all these cases, moving to central areas of Tokyo can be 
explained by several reasons: (a) raising the status and objectives of the Embassy; (b) increased financial 
support for the Embassy; (c) an increase in the intensity of contacts with Japanese partners. Accordingly, 
the issue of relocation remains an important tool for CA diplomacy in Japan, which, among other things, 
speaks of their desire to be closer to Kasumigaseki27. However, the four-storey building of the Kazakh 
Embassy has its official name--Azabu Kaisei Building Annex and is owned by a private Japanese company. 
So far, Kazakhstan is still far from the issue of acquiring own land and building in Japan, which can be 
considered as even more crucial step. In 2012, only 29 countries had own land slots in Tokyo (House of 
Representatives 2012). Traditionally, Kazakh MPs take a tough stance on the issue of purchasing expensive 
buildings and land slots for the MFA needs abroad. The modern history of Kazakhstan also recorded 
several cases of corruption offences around the construction of Kazakh embassies abroad28. At the same 
time, Kazakhstan does not have consulates general or consular posts in other Japanese cities. This suggests 
the current work of the Embassy covers the present level of bilateral relations. Moreover, according to the 
MOFA’s basic data on Japan-Kazakhstan relations, less than 600 Kazakhstani citizens live in Japan (2019). 
１．Honorary Consulates
　　Kazakhstan has three honorary consulates in Japan--in Nagoya (Aichi), Osaka and Fukuoka, which 
are important industrial and financial centers of Japan. Earlier, Kazakhstan had two additional honorary 
consulates in Sapporo (Hokkaido) and Kyoto29. Then, the president of a small transport company in 
Hokkaido and master of Buddhist association in Kyoto were listed as Kazakh honorary consuls. 
　　The Honorary Consulate in Osaka was opened on 25 Dec. 2018, in the regional office of Marubeni 
Corp., to “support accelerated economic and cultural ties between Kazakhstan and the Kansai region” 
(Marubeni 2019a). Marubeni’s local representative assumed the post of Honorary Consul. However, this 
is not the first consulate of Kazakhstan in Kansai. In 2009, in the wake of the development of commercial 
relations between JSC National Atomic Company “Kazatomprom” and Japanese energy companies, an 
honorary consulate was opened in the regional office of Toshiba Corp. (2009). Then, the post of honorary 
consul belonged to Toshiba’s representative. Such a radical shift was caused by transformation of business 
relations between Toshiba and Kazatomprom, as well as scandals around the leadership of the Japanese 
TNC30. This brief case shows that Kazakh economic diplomacy is extremely active in recruiting Japanese 
27　A metonym for the Japanese government entities.
28　 In 2018, two senior MFA officials were detained on charges of corruption violations. Please see Tengrinews, https://
tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/diplomata-erika-utembaeva-otpustili-pod-zalog-361587/. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
29　 “Honorary Consulate of Kazakhstan opened in Sapporo”, Kazinform, 9 Mar. 2010, https://www.inform.kz/en/honorary-
consulate-of-kazakhstan-opened-in-sapporo_a2245910. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
30　 In Dec. 2017, Toshiba bought back from “Kazatomprom” 10 per cent stake in Westinghouse Electric Company. In 
Mar. 2017, Westinghouse (a subsidiary of Toshiba) filed a petition for a bankruptcy proceeding under the US 
Bankruptcy Code. Please see Kazatomprom’s website, https://www.kazatomprom.kz/en/media/view/kazatomprom-
prodal-akcii-kompanii-westinghouse-electric. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
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companies to advance their positions in Japan. At the same time, Kazakhstan’s diplomats are sensitive to 
the reputational risks associated with business activities of their foreign partners, i.e. they try to avoid deals 
with troubled companies.
　　Honorary Consulate in Fukuoka opened in 2010 in the building of another energy company--Kyushu 
Electric Power (Kyushu Electric 2012). Currently, the consulate covers the following regions--Fukuoka, 
Saga, Nagasaki, Oita, Kumamoto, Miyazaki and Kagoshima. In 2010, the honorary consulate in Nagoya 
was opened at the HQ of another Japanese TNC--Toyota Tsusho. The inaugural ceremony was attended 
by the then Chairman of the lower chamber of Kazakh Parliament, Mr. Ural Mukhamedzhanov (JPubb 
2010). It is noteworthy Toyota Tsusho’s board of directors also includes former Foreign Minister of Japan, 
Mrs. Yoriko Kawaguchi, who was at the forefront of the creating CAJ in 2004. In addition, Kawaguchi 
frequently appears in Kazakh media, especially on CA and security-related issues. This fact may indicate 
that Japanese companies with business ties in Kazakhstan use various “attributes” to strengthen their profile 
in communication channels with Kazakhstani officials and vice versa. In general, these examples show one 
of the essential criteria for honorary consulates’ establishment in Japan were the interests of Japanese TNCs 
in Kazakh uranium and rare earth metals’ deposits (Ogawa 2009:90). In turn, the Honorary Consuls help 
the Kazakh Embassy to promote favorable discourse at the regional level, entrusting them with the main 
function of transmitting information about the country.
２．Communication Channels
　　The Embassy maintains several channels of communication with the Japanese audience31. In the first 
place is the Embassy’s website. Currently, the site functions on the same platform as the MFA does. The 
site is present in four languages--Russian, Kazakh, English, and Japanese. However, a large part of the 
posts is brief news reports. Accordingly, for the readers, it is challenging to perceive what exactly was 
discussed during the meetings. In addition, not all sections contain the information indicated in the title. 
The Embassy has four social media accounts32. YouTube channel has only 64 subscribers. There are 52 
videos, including the recordings of Kazakh TV programs, video clips and several original videos prepared 
by the Embassy itself. Instagram is a “supplement” to the Embassy’ posts on Facebook (FB) and has 599 
posts and 808 followers. The Embassy tweeted 1,068 times on its Twitter account, which has only 1,104 
followers. FB page has 5,492 likes and 5,663 followers. Thus, FB is one of the key and priority SNS in 
the Embassy’s work. Given the fact that among SNS subscribers there are also citizens of Kazakhstan, 
these figures indicate a weak interest of the Japanese audience in the Embassy’s activities in Japan. On 
FB, the Embassy most often uses such ordinary hashtags as “Kazakhstan”, “KazakhstanJapan” in Japanese 
and “KazakhstanJapan” in English. However, the Embassy rarely links other personal accounts and most 
often removes uncomfortable comments. The Japanese Embassy in Kazakhstan has only two accounts-- 
31　Excerpt from the speech of Amb. Baudarbek-Kozhatayev on 21 May 2019.
32　As of 1 Jan. 2020.
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Facebook with 1,595 followers and Instagram with 512 followers33. In addition, the Kazakh Embassy uses 
FB and the possible options for creating community groups to bring together all accessible Kazakh citizens 
in Japan. This once again confirms more priority is given to personal meetings with representatives of 
political and business communities of Japan. The author believes that in this way Kazakhstan is trying to 
use the available resources as efficiently as possible.
３．Mascots vs. Idols
　　Due to the high popularity of yuru-kyara talismans in Japan, several embassies designed their mascots. 
On its part, the Embassy partners also considered the option of using 2011 Asian Winter Games mascot in 
Nur-Sultan and Almaty--the Irbi snow leopard34. Their choice was related to one historical fact. In 2000, 
President Nazarbayev presented PM Obuchi a gift, snow leopard named Shyngys, “as a sign of friendship”. 
Until its death, Shyngys was kept in the Tama Zoological Park. However, this idea did not get any support 
from the Embassy. In 2006, President Nazarbayev also presented PM Koizumi two mountain sheep (argali) 
that were to be kept in the Tama Zoo too (Yahoo! 2007). However, these animals have been undelivered 
to Japan yet. More successful attempts to create “images” of bilateral relations include the efforts of 
individual Japanese citizens and organizations to popularize such famous Kazakhstanis as skater Mr. Denis 
Ten (Abe 2015), volleyball player Ms. Sabina Altynbekova, and singer Mr. Dimash Kudaibergen, who 
could relatively easily arouse interest among the Japanese media (Kosnazarov 2017). Most surprisingly, 
Ms. Altynbekova refused to pursue a successful career in Japanese entertainment and sports industries, 
despite her contract with the all-powerful Japanese PR company Dentsu35. In addition, based on the 
Embassy’s request, the Japanese company Kokka-en, assigned the name “President Nazarbayev” to a new 
variety of chrysanthemums in 201636. The choice was not accidental, given the historically important role 
of this flower in Japanese culture.
33　As of 1 Jan. 2020.
34　The author interviewed an unnamed employee of the MFA Kazakhstan on 21 Jun. 2019.
35　 “Japan, Kazakhstan: Dentsu Obtains Exclusive Marketing Rights to Kazakhstan Volleyball Player Sabina 
Altynbekova”, MENA Report, 31 Oct. 2015, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.tulips.tsukuba.ac.jp/docview/17284
88832?accountid=25225. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
36　“2016 History”, Kokkaen, http://www.kokkaen.co.jp/kikkaten/2016history.html. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
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Ｖ．“Club of Friends”
　　As was acknowledged by Amb. Kamaldinov, an informal club “Friends of Kazakhstan” operates in 
Japan, which includes more than 40 Japanese politicians, businesspersons, and diplomats37. According to 
Prof. Uyama (2004:201), in the beginning, Kazakhstan did not have any Japanese “patrons” to support 
Kazakh authorities in promoting intensive contacts with Japan. Therefore, creation of the group became 
a logic response from the Kazakh side to increase the role of Kazakhstan in the Japanese discourse38. 
Institutions and channels that could be involved in the establishment of such club as empirical shreds of 
evidence of “orders, structures, and systems” are indicated below (Hyaes 2017:91).
１．Joint Committees
　　In 1993, Japan-Kazakhstan and Kazakhstan-Japan economic cooperation committees (Joint 
Committee) were established. Nowadays, members of the committee act through the Japanese Association 
for Trade with Russia and the NIS (ROTOBO) and represent 11 Japanese companies: Marubeni, Itochu, 
Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Toyota Tsusho, Sojitz, Nissin, INPEX, MUFG Bank, and Japan Tobacco. 
The committee contributes to the development of business relations between Japanese private sector, 
government agencies, and Kazakh state enterprises. For its part, ROTOBO performs the role of a “bridge” 
between Kazakh and Japanese business communities, as well as the secretariat of the joint committee. 
Absence of a permanent secretariat on the Kazakh side could be related to numerous structural changes 
among the key state bodies of Kazakhstan and frequent personnel shifts among senior officials. Besides, 
absence of subcommittees suggests the activities of the joint committee are aimed at solving common 
tasks, including those concerning the preparation of general meetings. Various panel sessions during 
regular meetings are designed to compensate for the lack of additional sub-units.
２．Investment Network
　　The Japan-Kazakhstan Investment Network was created on 31 Mar. 2011 based on ROTOBO’s 
website. Similar resources also exist with respect to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. 
The source is employed to post information about investment seminars, presentations, as well as analytical 
reports and project proposals. In 2007, the Embassy also attempted to create own portal to convey 
business-related information in Japanese. However, the Embassy’s source has lost its relevance due to 
the appearance of new state business entities in Kazakhstan. The Embassy of Kazakhstan equally uses 
Investment Network to counteract the activities of organizations that have compromised themselves. 
37　 Amb. Kamaldinov’s interview to the TV Programme “Kabinety” (24KZ). Youtube. 16 Nov. 2014. https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=4eokwyr1yCg. (Accessed: 06/12/2019).
38　Prof. Tetsuji Tanaka, personal communication on 14 Feb. 2018.
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For example, the first and only official appeal was made in respect of the Japanese NGO “Progress”39. 
According to the MFA employee, Kazakh embassy often has to deal with “scammers”, who are trying to 
take advantage of Kazakh interest in economic cooperation with Japanese business. Embassy employees 
use different tricks that help them identify impostors at earlier stages40.
３．Intergovernmental Commission
　　In 2008, during the visit of the First President to Japan, the two countries agreed to raise the level 
of the joint committee by including Japanese officials, i.e. METI, MOFA and other Japanese entities, to 
its composition. Initially, in 2006, chair of Kazakh part, Mr. Bolat Palymbetov, then-Vice-Minister of 
Economy and Budget Planning, raised two issues: the transformation of the committee and raising its 
status (Dadabaev 2019:49). At that time, meetings of the committee were not convened regularly. The 
interval between the seventh and eighth meetings was four years, and the interval between the eighth and 
ninth meetings was two years. The first meeting of the Joint Commission of the Government and Private 
Sectors of Kazakhstan and Japan was held in 2009 in Nur-Sultan41. Since that, a two-tier mechanism for 
promoting business contacts has been created in Kazakhstan and Japan. Joint committee remains the “core” 
of the commission, while government agencies act as “superstructures” that give special status to bilateral 
relations. In addition, this mechanism establishes the basis of state support for bilateral business initiatives. 
This fact may also lead to the failure of CA countries to construct a separate multilateral business platform 
within the framework of CAJ Dialogue (Dissyukov 2019:13).
４．Foreign Investors Council
　　Currently, two Japanese companies, Marubeni and Mitsubishi, are the members of the Council of 
Foreign Investors (FIC) under the President of Kazakhstan. Marubeni became the last full member of the 
FIC in 2017. In 2018, Vice-Chairman of Marubeni assumed the post of co-chairman of the joint committee 
(Marubeni 2019b). However, until 2015, i.e. before the visit of PM Shinzo Abe to Central Asia, Marubeni 
headed a business committee with Uzbekistan, and Mitsubishi with Kazakhstan. It seems that on the eve of 
the visit, two companies agreed on a mutual exchange of two posts. In general, FIC establishes a channel 
for communication with the Japanese business, as well as the Japan-led ADB. Moreover, Marubeni and 
Mitsubishi de-facto act as the collective voice of the Japanese business in Kazakhstan.
５．Parliamentary Friendship League
　　Parliamentary diplomacy in Japan is seen as an important component for “deepening international 
understanding and friendship” (House of Representatives 2013). According to Kazakh Embassy’s posts on 
39　ROTOBO, http://www.jp-kz.org/data/from%20kzembassy.pdf. (Accessed: 24/06/2019).
40　The author interviewed an unnamed employee of the MFA Kazakhstan on 21 Jun. 2019.
41　ROTOBO, http://www.jp-kz.org/conference/1st/summary1.pdf. (Accessed: 20/12/2019).
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FB, the league comprises of more than 40 MPs, including Mr. Takeo Kawamura (chairman), Mr. Naokazu 
Takemoto, Mrs. Yamamoto, Mrs. Yasuko Komiyama, Mr. Takeshi Shina (secretary-general), Mr. Yasutoshi 
Nishimura, Mr. Masaharu Nakagawa, Mr. Akira Sato, Rev. Seigo Kitamura, Mr. Yoshitaka Sakurada, 
Mrs. Takako Suzuki (daughter of a famous Japanese politician Mr. Muneo Suzuki), Mrs. Nakayama, Mr. 
Gen Matsubara, and others. At different times, the heads of the league were former PMs of Japan, i.e. Mr. 
Ryutaro Hashimoto42 43 and Mr. Yukio Hatoyama44, as well as Mr. Shoichi Nakagawa (close friend of PM 
Abe)45 and Mr. Satsuki Eda (former President of the House of Councilors)46. Composition of the league is 
very impressive. It cannot be ruled out that Kazakh diplomats place a great emphasis on the level of league 
members. As readers can understand, MPs represent various political parties. This fact shows that Japanese 
MPs had achieved a consensus regarding the importance of Kazakh direction for Japan. This attitude helps 
the Kazakh side to avoid any form of criticism--the situation that significantly distinguishes Japanese MPs 
from their Western colleagues. 
　　The main issues related to the league’s activities have been discussed during general gatherings (not 
regularly) with the participation of Kazakh and Japanese diplomats. It is known that league members 
at least came up with several initiatives they provided support to Kazakh bid for holding EXPO-2017; 
nominated the First President of Kazakhstan for a Nobel Peace Prize; advanced ratification of several 
bilateral agreements47. In essence, it turns out that the league is actively interacting with Kazakhstan 
and supports the importance of Kazakhstan’s initiatives and ideas. According to the Kazakh diplomat, a 
compact group, i.e. the league’s leaders, usually produces league’s decisions. For example, in 2009-2012, 
the key role and the initiative belonged to the DPJ deputies and after 2012 again to the LDP deputies. The 
author believes that despite the party differences, the league members should follow several unwritten 
rules, namely, respect the decisions of the league leadership, no matter which party he/she represents. The 
league chair also accompanies the Ambassador and other senior Kazakh officials during their meetings 
with the Cabinet members, Parliament and LDP officials. In reality, the Chairman acts as a principal “patron” 
of Kazakh interests in Japan. However, this cannot be called affirmative since SNS accounts appeared 
only in 2014. For example, in Apr. 2019, Kawamura attended PM Abe’s meeting with former Kazakh PM 
42　 “Japan’s Former PM Heads Parliamentary Japan-Kazakhstan League: Russia & FSU News Bulletin Edition”, Daily 
News Bulletin, 15 Feb. 2002, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.tulips.tsukuba.ac.jp/docview/456151229?account
id=25225. (Accessed: 20/12/2019).
43　 Japan’s “Eurasian Diplomacy” concept was formulated by PM Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997.
44　 “Nihon Kazafusutan yūkō giin renmei sōkai”, Personal blog of MP Komiyama, 9 Mar. 2011, http://www.yasko.
net/2011/03/post_1133.html. (Accessed: 20/12/2019).
45　 “Takeo’s Action”, Personal blog of MP Kawamura, http://www.tspark.net/report/action/0706.html. (Accessed: 
11/12/2019).
46　 “Eda Satsuki katsudō nisshi”, Personal blog of Mr. Eda, 16 Dec. 2010, http://www.tspark.net/report/action/0706.html. 
(Accessed: 20/12/2019).
47　 Findings are based on publications by the league members, e.g. Mrs. Komiyama and Mr. Hiroyuki Moriyama, on their 
blogs and FB pages.
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Massimov. However, reports on that meeting are still unpublished (Nikkei 2019).
Ⅵ．Media: Formation of Images
　　There are no representative offices of other Kazakh organizations in Japan. At the same time, there 
is a small office of Kazakh TV channel “24KZ” in Tokyo. Analysis of the reports shows that most of the 
materials accounted for: (a) reports about Japan; (b) reports on bilateral cooperation; (c) assessments 
of political events in Kazakhstan by Japanese speakers. On its part, Japanese media do not have their 
representative offices in Kazakhstan. All information comes from Moscow offices (e.g. Mainichi Shimbun) 
or Kazakh freelancers (e.g. Nikkei Asian Review). This also does not speak in favor of both countries. 
Kazakhstan is trying to manipulate public opinion regarding Japan, showing both the enormous potential 
for cooperation and the presence of certain difficulties in Japan as possible deterrents in Tokyo’s actions. 
The Japanese, on the other hand, they see no reason for a permanent presence in CA, which indicates, 
apparently, weak interest of the Japanese audience in the region48. If the MFA uses all the possible 
opportunities for publications in Japan, the MOFA will most often resort to traditional media in Kazakhstan 
(e.g. “Kazinform” news agency). However, most of the interviews appear exclusively on the eve of 
significant Japanese visits to Kazakhstan. 
Ⅶ．Conclusion
　　Analysis of the aforementioned data shows that Kazakhstan’s diplomatic institutions in Japan play 
the most prominent role in maintaining close contacts with the political circles, especially with the PM’s 
Office, Parliament, and the MOFA, to provide political support to the Kazakh agenda in Japan. Thanks to 
these contacts, diplomatic institutions play an important role in the formation of identities and norms that 
define Kazakh-Japanese relations. Moreover, as shown in the paper, these norms are formed exclusively 
at the political level. Accordingly, we see how the two countries are trying to apply two different identities 
to each other. On its part, Kazakhstan is trying to adhere to the “golden mean,” realizing the importance 
of preserving “Self-Others” model and forming an alternative, “Half-Self” and “Half-Others” approach. 
Besides, the Government and political actors in Japan allow foreign agents to construct and maintain 
various platforms for communication with local agents. In this regard, politicians, in addition to the 
MOFA, are trying to produce new tools for gathering information, developing an international network of 
professional contacts, as well as promoting their foreign policy ambitions. As a result, foreign embassies 
allow Japanese agents to increase their authority and the likelihood of their future involvement in various 
diplomatic efforts. On its part, embassies receive access and assistance from the politicians who are directly 
or indirectly involved in the process of making foreign policy decisions.
48　Prof. Shigeki Hakamada, personal communication on 27 Feb. 2018. 
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